Historical Overview of Conflict in Southern Africa and its Impact on Development

PESA Regional Integration Monitor, Jan 2019

The January 2019 issue focuses on the history of conflict and political instability in SADC, and its impact on economic growth and development - What is the overall history of political stability and conflict? How politically stable or unstable has SADC been since independence? How has this affected economic growth and development? Has economic growth and development been disrupted? What needs to be improved or changed to resolve the political impasse? What is needed to improve economic growth and long-term development? The PESA Regional Integration Monitor, Jan 2019 examines some of these questions.

Historical Overview of Conflict in Southern Africa and its Impact on Development

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one of the most politically and economically stable regional blocs on the African continent. However, economic growth and development in the region have been negatively affected by conflict and political instability. The region has had to grapple with the long term damaged caused by colonial policies that denied many people ownership and autonomous use of their land and contributed to ethnic and region tensions. For instance, the protracted conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – which has drawn in a number of members states since it began in the 1960s – has its origins in the colonial period. More recently, the region has faced political instability due disputed elections, which in certain instances have degenerated into political violence locally with broader regional implications. The conflicts and political instability in some countries in the region over the past decade have definitely had implications on SADC’s economic growth and development. Conflict and political instability has hindered regional investments by disrupting markets and regional value chains. As the economies in the region have become more integrated, the disruption of markers and regional value chains caused by conflict has negatively impacted the overall economic performance of the region.


The current political instability and conflict in Southern Africa can be traced back to the colonial era. Many colonial governments implemented policies which displaced a large number of people and limited their economic opportunities, which in turn contributed to the creation of resistance movement and in conflicts within the region. Many of the most unpopular policies were so-called conservation policies, wherein colonial administrators justified displacing people and interfering with local economic structures under the guise of preserving resources and modernising the African economy. For example, the colonial government in Tanganyika (modern day Tanzania) introduced soil conservation projects in the 1950s from where people were removed from the Shambaai mountain areas to become wage workers[1]. In Northern Rhodesia (modern day Zambia) people in the Mweru – Luapula region were restricted from fishing, even during the open season, in an attempt to conserve depleting fish stocks[2]. These policies were often poorly implemented and negatively impacted people’s lives[3]. Many of the colonial conservation projects were implemented through indirect rule by the local chiefs who lost popularity among the subjects[4]. The discontented citizens began to organise local resistance organisations, which were often integrated into larger liberation movements that that strived for decolonisation.


The liberation struggles for independence varied from country to country, with nations like Botswana experiencing relatively peaceful transitions, while independence movements and post-colonial governments in other nations faced harsher resistance. In some cases, such as South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (modern day Zimbabwe), colonial governments imposed repressive measures to curb resistance and maintain the colonial regime. This resulted in a civil war in Zimbabwe from 1964-1979 and a civil struggle in South Africa from 1976-1994[5]. In other instances, the region’s colonisers left relatively peacefully, but rival political factions began fighting for control, causing prolonged civil wars. In Angola and Mozambique civil wars broke out after the Portuguese left the countries and communist parties – the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in Angola and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique – were elected into power, but were met by strong resistance from counter-insurgent União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)[6].


These conflicts had a massive impact on the region, as various factions across these nations formed alliances to support one another. In 1963 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the first post-colonial regional organisation on the continent, was founded by countries who had recently gained independence and various liberation movements in order to foster African unity and promote growth and stability on the continent. The OAU sourced funding from the international community to support the MPLA and FRELIMO, as well as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe to support them in their various conflicts creating a network of alliances[7]. Because the ANC, MPLA, and FRELIMO were affiliated with the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, the anti-communist South African apartheid government and the United States of America intervened in the conflicts in Mozambique and Angola  by backing rebel movements such as UNITA and RENAMO[8]. As part of their efforts to thwart groups affiliated with the ANC and OAU the South African Defence Force (SADF) invaded several neighbouring countries, including Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique, where they destroyed vital infrastructure to disrupt supply chains in the region[9]. The apartheid government also orchestrated the assassination of ANC exiles in Botswana and Lesotho that at times caused significant collateral damage[10].



One of the motives behind the apartheid government’s interventions into conflicts in the region was to prevent other Southern African countries from establishing economies that were independent from South Africa’s[11]. For instance, the destruction of railways in some SADC countries disrupted trade and forced countries to use South African ports and routes for international trade[12]. Countries that had to transport their goods via South Africa had to pay millions of dollars in fees to the apartheid government, for example Zambia spent about USD 250 million for using South African transport as an alternative to Angola and Mozambique, while Malawi incurred USD 12 billion for using South Africa routes instead of the nearest ones[13]. Furthermore, countries that had to defend their own infrastructure from attack accrued an estimated USD 15 billion in costs. For example, Zimbabwe spent USD 3.5 billion for the military to guard communication networks in Mozambique from 1980-1988[14]. However, with the demise of apartheid rule and introduction of democracy in South Africa in 1994, incidence of South African military intrusion into other countries stopped. The communication networks between other SADC countries have not been rebuilt but trade relations between countries in the region have improved.


Nevertheless, the guerrilla warfare in Zimbabwe and the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique demonstrated typical political violence in the region[15]. The consequences of the civil war in Mozambique are still being felt today. Agricultural production declined due to large areas of arable land being turned into minefields, the destruction of infrastructure, and the loss of business by many entrepreneurs[16]. The economy of Mozambique plummeted after independence in 1975 and the GDP dropped by 8% by 1980[17]. The decline in the performance of Mozambique economy resulted in poverty and migration of people into the neighbouring states in search of employment opportunities[18].  After the end of the Cold War international support for RENAMO and UNITA ended, causing the former to end the conflict in Mozambique. However, UNITA had been able to secure control of large areas of resource rich land with the help of the SADF and were able to continue fighting until the death of leader Jonas Malheiro Savimbi in early 2002[19].


Across the continent rebel groups like UNITA have been able to trade their country’s natural resources to fuel conflict is the region. This has had a detrimental impact on many countries, especially the DRC, which is listed among the poorest in the world despite having abundant natural resources. A number of different rebel groups have taken over control natural resource rich areas in some parts of the DRC since the country gain independence in 1960[20]. These groups illegally trade these resources through multi-national corporations. However, it is rather difficult for some multi-national corporations to determine whether the mining contracts they are issued are being illegally issued by the rebel groups or legally obtained from the Congolese government[21]. The problem has been exacerbated by conflicts from the neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda and Uganda, bleeding over into the DRC. There have even been reports of neighbouring governments supporting certain rebel groups so that they can also profit from a share of the DRC natural resources[22]. The resource-based conflicts in DRC have caused deaths of an estimated 20 people in 1994 in Goma, and to this day there are rebel-controlled danger zones throughout the country. As a result, there have been a number of attempts to solve the conflict by the external bodies, such as the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, but many of them were fruitless[23].


The struggle for access to land is another factor that can be linked to current political instability and conflict in the SADC region. The 1913 Natives Land Act in South Africa and the 1930 Land Apportionment Act in Zimbabwe began a process which forced African people from their land to make way for white commercial farmers[24]. In Zimbabwe, tension around land distribution caused the government to adopt the Fast Track Land Reform process in late 1990s which resulted in the seizure of large areas of white owned land and an increase of violence in the region[25]. In South Africa, there is a growing amount of tension surrounding the land issue, due to the slow rate of land reform. While no formal conflict has broken out yet, the government is conscious of the tensions surrounding the land issue and is carefully planning new policies and amendments to the constitution to resolve the matter before they escalate[26].


Political instability and conflict have remained prevalent in some Southern African countries in the post-independence era due to power struggles that gave birth to emergence of one-party states. For example, in Zimbabwe, an operation known as Gukurahundi led to the mass killings of about 20 000 people in 1983 - 1984 and it is argued that that the operation was meant stymie political pluralism in the country[27]. Political repression continued in Zimbabwe when the government cracked down on the opposition political parties and coalition of civil society organisation during general elections in the early 21st century[28]. The ZANU-PF led government has often been accused abducting and torturing members of the opposition. The leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, Morgan Tsvangirai was severely tortured in police custody on several occasions[29]. The internal factional battles within ZANU-PF led to the removal of President Robert Mugabe through a coup in 2017[30]. The post-Mugabe government led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa is viewed as reformist in both the political and economic sphere. Nonetheless, the economic situation has deteriorated since the July 2018 elections.


Lesotho has also struggled with shaking their authoritarian leaders for 48 years. After losing the1970 National Assembly elections to the Basotho Congress Party, then Lesotho Prime Minister Joseph Leabua Jonathan suspended the constitution and tortured members of the opposition, forcing them to flee the country[31]. Twenty eight years later, post-election political violence broke out in Lesotho  because the opposition believed the 1998 general elections had been rigged[32]. These problems have continued into the 21st century and Lesotho has held three general elections held over the last five years[33]. There was even an attempted coup on 30 August 2014 against Prime Minister Tom Thabane that jeopardised the renewal of African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and made Millennium Challenge Account compact to be at stake[34].


Nevertheless, the recent political violence in Lesotho and Zimbabwe associated with protests against the results of the general elections indicate that instituting democratic processes may not reduce conflict in a region[35]. Often political instability can also be caused by a lack of service delivery and general dissatisfaction with a government. For example, Madagascar has experienced a large amount of civil unrest since the collapse of the socialist regime in the state in 1989 and the election of President Albert Zafy in 1992. The Zafy government failed to employ policies to reduce poverty and strikes and other protest actions broke out. As a result, in 1996 Zafy’s rule came to an end, and elections were called in November of that year. Didier Ignace Ratsiraka won the election in 1996 but was voted out of office in 2001 to Marc Ravalomanana[36]. The results of the elections were highly contested, and the two opposing parties mobilised their followers to engage in armed confrontations[37].


The political unrest in Madagascar intensified in 2009 when violent anti-government demonstrations (that included looting, arson, and the deaths of between 70 and 80 people) broke out. Once again, people were unsatisfied with the way the government had attempted to address economic challenges facing the country. Allegations of corruption and suppression of freedom of expression made against Ravalomanana by his rival, Andry Rajoelina have also intensified the conflict[38]. Ravalomanana ousted from office in, but the conflict continued. Since then there have been several attempted coups that have resulted in death of undisclosed number of people in the country. In 2009 political riots caused the United States of America to suspend the 2008 AGOA Trade Concession[39]. This adversely affected export of cash crops, such as vanilla. In addition, the World Bank suspended financial support to the government of Madagascar[40]. Therefore, while there is a history of post-election violence in Madagascar, the main catalyst for conflict in the region is the failure of the dictatorial government to properly address issues in the country and improve economic growth. This combined with the suppression of freedom of speech has resulted in the Malagasy people using violence as the only means to push for change in their country.


However, conflict in SADC has steadily decreased over the past two decades, by and large thanks to increased regional integration. SADC was formed with the sole purpose of linking member states to regional economies, to strengthen the region’s economic performance, enhance its political stability, and foster peace[41]. Conflicts amongst member states can hinder the regional bloc’s objective of promoting economic and social development through cooperation and economic integration. Therefore, the SADC Treaty was drafted in order to guide member states towards peaceful resolutions for conflicts in their countries. The treaty promotes sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development; deeper cooperation and integration; as well as good governance and durable peace[42]. These shared aims inform the region’s quest for collective stability and sustainable development, all of which can be realised through regional economic integration[43]. This is easily achievable as Southern African region is politically and socially interconnected and interdependent[44].


Southern African countries have also undergone the process of political and economic transition since the turn of the century. Even though each member state claims to be democratic, the degree to which democracy exists differs through experience of transition and how political parties have consolidated their power[45]. Nevertheless, there are many successes Botswana is cited as the most democratic country in Africa with a history of peace, stability and democratic elections since its independence in 1966. South Africa and Namibia have also been commended for their democratic constitutions and respect for the rule of law since their independence in 1994 and 1990 respectively. Malawi and Zambia have made transitions in the early 1990s from decades of one-party states to multiparty democracies. In Mozambique, a successful transition from three decades of war to peace in 1992 made way for a vibrant period of reconstruction and development. In Angola, an end to decades of war was only accomplished after the death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in early 2002[46].


Even though there are isolated incidences in the region, SADC is characterised today by relative peace and conflict-free environment. Most member states presently enjoy manageable levels of social conflict and internal security and stability. This peace and stability should bode well for future economic development and the sustainability of social and political movements aimed at attaining greater democracy, making SADC truly exceptional on the continent in this regard[47]. This is an indication of the level of stability and respect for and expectation of civilian rule that is not found elsewhere throughout Africa[48].


By Kudzai Tamuka Moyo, Michael Andina and Tsepiso Rantso

[1] Feierman, S. 1990. Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania, University of Wisconsin Press: Madison.

[2] Musambachime, M. 1987. ‘Rural Political Protest: The 1953 Disturbances in Mweru-Luapula’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 437-453. Available At: https://www.jstor.org/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018]

[3] Musambachime, M. 1987. ‘Rural Political Protest: The 1953 Disturbances in Mweru – Luapula’ ibid.

[4] Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject, Princeton University Press: Princeton.

[5] SAHO 2018. Zimbabwe, on the South African History Online Website, viewed on 14 November 2018, from https://www.sahistory.org.za/; SAG 2018.  History, on the South African Government Website, viewed on 14 November 2018, from https://www.gov.za/.

[6] GoA 2015. The History, on the Government of Angola Website, viewed on 14 November 2018, from http://www.governo.gov.ao/; GoM 2015. The Struggle for Independence, on the Government of Mozambique Website, viewed on 14 November 2018, from http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/.

[7] Khawas, M. 1977. ‘Southern Africa: A Challenge to the OAU’, Africa Today, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 25-41. Available At: https://www.jstor.org/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018].

[8] Friedland, E. A. 1982. ‘South Africa and Instability in Southern Africa’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 463, Issue 1, pp. 95-105. Available At: https://journals.sagepub.com/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018].

[9] Davies, R. 1992. ‘Emerging South African Perspectives on Regional Cooperation and Integration after Apartheid’, Transformation, No. 20, pp. 75-87. Available At: http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/ [Last Accessed 5: November 2018]

[10] Matlosa, K. 1999. ‘Conflict and Conflict Management: Lesotho’s Political Crisis After the 1998 Election’, Lesotho Social Science Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 163-196. Available At: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018].

[11] Chimanikire, D. P. 1990. South Africa’s Destabilisation Policy: The Zimbabwe Experience, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies: Harare. Available At: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/ [Last Accessed: 5 November 2018]

[12] Davies, R. 1992. ‘Emerging South African Perspectives on Regional Cooperation and Integration after Apartheid’, ibid.

[13] Sparks, D. 1993. ‘The Peace Divided: Southern Africa After Apartheid’, Indicator South Africa, Vol. 10, Issue 2, pp. 27-32. Available At: https://journals.co.za/ [Last Accessed: 5 November 2018]

[14] Sparks, D. 1993. ‘The Peace Divided: Southern Africa After Apartheid’, ibid.

[15] Friedland, E. A. 1982. ‘South Africa and Instability in Southern Africa’, ibid.

[16] Dana, L. P. and France, N. 1996. ‘Small Business in Mozambique After the War’, Journal of Small Business Management, Vol. 34, Issue 4, pp. 67-71. Available At: https://www.questia.com/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018].

[17] Cammack, D. 1987. ‘The “Human Face” of Destabilisation: The War in Mozambique’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 40, Issue 40, pp. 65-75. Available At: https://www.tandfonline.com/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018].

[18] Cammack, D. 1987. ‘The “Human Face” of Destabilisation: The War in Mozambique’, ibid.

[19] Bauer, G. and Taylor, S. D. 2005. Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder. Available At: https://www.rienner.com/ [Last Accessed: 20 October 2018]

[20] Burnley, C. 2011. ‘Natural Resources Conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Question of Governance?’, Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 7-11, 52-53. Available At: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ [Last Accessed: 6 November 2018].

[21] Olaopa, O. R. and Ojakorotu, V. 2016. ‘Conflict about Natural Resources and the Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Journal of Social Science, Vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 244-256. Available At: http://krepublishers.com/ Last Accessed: 6 November 2018].

[22] Olaopa, O. R. and Ojakorotu, V. 2016. ‘Conflict about Natural Resources and the Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, ibid.

[23] Olaopa, O. R. and Ojakorotu, V. 2016. ‘Conflict about Natural Resources and the Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, ibid.

[24] Gwenhamo, F., Fedderke, J. W. and de Kadt, R. 2012. ‘Measuring Institutions: Indicators of Political Rights, Property Rights and Political Instability in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 49, Issue 4, pp. 593-603. Available At: https://doi.org/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018].

[25] Chiweshe, M. K. 2017. ‘Zimbabwe’s Land Question in the Context of Large-Scale Land Based Investments’, Geography Research Forum, Vol. 37, pp. 13-36. Available At: http://raphael.geography.ad.bgu.ac.il/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018].

[26] DRDLR. 2018.  Annual Report 2016-2017, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform: Pretoria. Available At:  http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/ [Last Accessed: 14 November 18].

[27] Maclean, S. J. 2001. ‘Mugabe at War: The Political Economy of Conflict in Zimbabwe’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 513-528. Available At: https://www.tandfonline.com/ [Last Accessed: 14 November 18]. The numbers of the people killed during the Gukurahundi operation are contested. For a more comprehensive analysis of the operation and number of people killed see: CCJPZ 1997. A Report on the 1980’s Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe: Harare. Available At: http://www.rhodesia.nl/ [Last Accessed: 20 November 18].

[28] Gwenhamo, F., Fedderke, J. W. and de Kadt, R. 2012. ‘Measuring Institutions: Indicators of Political Rights, Property Rights and Political Instability in Zimbabwe’, ibid.

[29] Humphreys, J. 2017.  Tsvangirai Allegedly Tortured in Police Custody, on The Irish Times Website, viewed on 6 November 2018, from https://www.irishtimes.com/.

[30] AFP 2018. Mugabe’s Party Accuses Army Chief of ‘Treasonable Conduct, on the News24 Website, viewed on 6 November 2018, from https://www.news24.com/.

[31] Letsie, T. W. 2009. What Causes Election-Related Conflict Within Democracies: A Case Study of Lesotho, University of the Western Cape: Bellville. Available At: http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ [Last Accessed: 6 November 2018].

[32] Mothibe, T. 1999. ‘The Military and Democratisation in Lesotho’, Lesotho Social Sciences Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp.47-63. Available At: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/ [Last Accessed: 20 September 2018].

[33] LT 2017. IEC will Get Money for Polls, on Lesotho Times Website, viewed on 14 November 2014, from https://lestimes.com/.

[34] Weisfelder, R. 2015. ‘Free Elections and Political Instability in Lesotho’, Journal of African Elections, Vol. 14,

No. 2, pp. 50-80. Available At: https://eisa.org.za/  [Last Accessed: 20 November 2018].

[35] Weisfelder, R. 2015. ‘Free Elections and Political Instability in Lesotho’, ibid.; Sharman, J., Embury-Dennis, T., Cockburn, H. and Osborne, S. 2018.  Zimbabwe Elections: Three Dead in Violent Harare Protests as Security Forces Battle Demonstrators After ZANU-PF Win in Parliament Vote, on The Independent Website, viewed on 6 November 2018, from https://www.independent.co.uk/.

[36] Ploch, L. and Cook, N. 2012. Madagascar’s Political Crisis, Congressional Research Service: Washington, D. C. Available At: https://fas.org/ [Last Accessed: 7 November 18].

[37] Ploch, L. and Cook, N. 2012. Madagascar’s Political Crisis, ibid.

[38] Ploch, L. and Cook, N. 2012. Madagascar’s Political Crisis, ibid.

[39] Andriamahery, A. and Zhou, J. 2018. ‘The Impact of Political Instability on Madagascar Vanilla Exports’, Open Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 27-38. Available At: https://www.scirp.org/ [Last Accessed: 7 November 2018].

[40] Andriamahery, A. and Zhou, J. 2018. ‘The Impact of Political Instability on Madagascar Vanilla Exports’, ibid.

[41] Cawthra, G. 2010. The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe, Fredrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Maputo. Available At: https://library.fes.de/ [Last Accessed: 5 October 2018].

[42] SADC 2014. Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Southern African Development Community: Gaborone. Available At: https://www.sadc.int/ [Last Accessed: 5 October 2018].

[43] Chauvin, S. and Gaulier, G. 2002. Regional Trade Integration in Southern Africa, Centre for Prospective Studies and International Information: Paris. Available At: http://www.cepii.fr/ [Last Accessed: 5 November 2018].

[44] Bauer, G. and Taylor, S. D. 2005. Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition, ibid.

[45] Bauer, G. and Taylor, S. D. 2005. Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition, ibid.

[46] Bauer, G. and Taylor, S. D. 2005. Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition, ibid.

[47] Cawthra, G. 2010. The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe, ibid.

[48] Bauer, G. and Taylor, S. D. 2005. Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition, ibid.

Industry Spotlight: Mozambican Oil and Gas

Several countries in the SADC region have experienced extensive political conflicts and turmoil since they gained independence, and still face challenges of redistributing wealth among their citizens. Some of these conflicts have been centred on access to and control over natural resources. These problems have been exacerbated by colonial legacies, whereby colonial governments created a system of natural resource management which undermines the socially- or economically-optimal and environmentally-friendly distribution of natural resources. Because resource-based conflicts are so common in Africa, conflicts and economic development in Africa has become inextricably linked. As such, natural resources can be seen as a curse, as an abundance of natural resources tends to lead to serious conflicts and poor governance characterised by predatory and oligarchic behavior of the ruling elite[1]. However, they are not the real cause of the problem, rather the poor management of resources and the desire to amass personal wealth instead of benefitting society is the main cause of instability across the continent. This situation has resulted in conflicts that have severely derailed growth and development trajectories of many SADC countries. For example, the conflict that has developed in Mozambique since 2013, illustrates how the resource-conflict nexus that has negatively impacted growth across the continent.


Most of the natural gas in the country is found in the Mozambique and Rovuma Basins. The 300 000km² Mozambique Basin has been mined for over a century. It is located in the centre of the country and extends off-shore. The 60 000 km² Rovuma Basin, which was discovered between 2003 and 2009 in the Inhassoro, East Temane and Ndjika, is located in the Cabo Delgado province in the north of the country[2].  The country currently has a total of 222 active wells – 178 exploration and 44 production wells[3]. It is estimated that Mozambique’s gas reserves are high enough to fuel South Africa’s energy demands for 150 to 200 years[4]. Therefore, Mozambique’s natural gas and oil deposits have the potential to provide the entire SADC region with their energy needs, as well as employment opportunities for both skilled and unskilled labour across the region[5]. However, the Sofala, Inhambane, and Cabo Delgado province have become hotspots of political violence since 2013. Therefore, the promise for national and regional socio-economic development offered by the discovery of oil and gas in Mozambique is threatened by open and covert political conflict in the country[6]. This raises the following questions for ordinary Mozambicans and policy-makers at the regional level: What is the historical context of conflict in Mozambique? How has it affected the oil and gas industry and the economy in general? How has it been managed by the government and what have the results of those interventions been? How can this conflict be handled in a manner that gives hope to the current and future generations?


There has been interest in the oil and gas industry in Mozambique since it was first discovered in the early 20th century. The first surveys for natural gas in Mozambique were carried out in Inhaminga in the Sofala province in 1904. In 1920, similar gas surveys were carried out in Pande in the Inhambane province[7]. The first intensive wave of resource extraction involving big oil companies (such as Gulf and Amoco, Hunt, Aquitaine & Sunray, and Clark & Skelly) took place under the Portuguese colonial government from 1948-1974[8]. In the 1960s, gas fields were discovered in Pande (1961), Buzi (1962), and Temane (1967)[9]. The industry was disrupted after the Portuguese withdrew from Mozambique in 1975 and a civil war broke out between the ruling FRELIMO and counter-insurgent forces from the RENAMO that lasted from 1977-1992.


RENAMO fought against FRELIMO's attempts to consolidate its power as the ruling party of a socialist one-party state, and was supported by anti-communist governments in the then Rhodesia and South Africa. For their part, the Rhodesian and South African military establishments used RENAMO as a proxy to weaken FRELIMO’s support for militant nationalist organisations in their own countries[10]. About one million Mozambicans were butchered in the fighting or starved due to interrupted food and energy supplies. An additional five million people were displaced. The Mozambican Civil War destroyed much of Mozambique's rural infrastructure, including hospitals, rail lines, roads, and schools[11]. The hostilities between FRELIMO and RENAMO ended in 1992 after the signing of the Rome General Peace Accords and there was relative peace and prosperity until 2012[12]. A lot of international investors poured money into the Mozambican economy, including in the newly revived oil and gas sector.


The discovery of oil and gas in Mozambique’s Northern Provinces in the early 21st century brought great hope and optimism to its citizens and the region at large[13]. The country was expected to become one of the largest economies in Africa, with the hope that natural gas production in the Northern provinces would reach its peak in 2028[14]. In 2016, the Mozambican economy was expected to grow by 24% per year and half of its GDP was earmarked to come from natural gas by that time[15]. Realising the key role of oil and gas in its economy, Mozambique undertook fiscal and licensing reforms[16]. The Mozambican government created the Natural Gas Master Plan in 2014. The policy aims to use the unique opportunities afforded to Mozambique to accelerate the country’s development through various industries of regional and global scale[17]. It seeks to ensure that natural gas resources are developed to maximise the benefits to the country in terms of improving the living standards of its citizens and minimising the negative environmental effects through increasing the institutional capacities of national public and private entities and providing greater access to education, vocational training and employment to Mozambican people. As such, the policy is supposed to be anchored on a set of values that include transparency, impartiality, social justice and equality, participation and access to information[18].


Several structures have also been made to try and ensure that income generated by Mozambique’s natural gas and oil industry benefit the country as a whole. The National Petroleum Institute (INP) is responsible for the sector’s regulation and promotion. The Ministry of Mineral Resources also seeks to encourage the sustainable use of natural gas in Mozambique through the INP. The National Enterprise of Hydrocarbons represents the state’s commercial interests in any concessions made with oil companies and has the exclusivity in all oil and gas operation in the country. Concessions are awarded, as a rule, through public tender, simultaneous negotiation or direct negotiation[19]. These concessions agreements are done under the Mozambican’s law. For example, the Research and Production Concession Agreement grants exclusive right to conduct oil and gas operations and nonexclusive right to construct and operate infrastructure[20]. To ensure that the concessions benefit the public, the state requires that national interests, existing economic activities and other natural resources are protected[21]. In addition, a quota of at least 25 percent of oil and gas produced in the country is dedicated to the domestic market[22]. General labor legislation in Mozambique and specific labor laws for oil and gas sector establish a quota regime limiting the number of expatriates to a maximum of 10 percent[23]. However, these rules are not strictly enforced by the government and institutional corruption is rampant throughout the country.


Nevertheless, these reforms have produced some successes. Six oil companies – Sasol from South Africa, Statoil form Norway, Anadarko from the USA, ENI from Italy, Petronas from Malaysia, and Buzi Hydrocarbons from Indonesia – have shown interest in undertaking exploration and production of natural gas in Mozambique[24]. These companies obtained exploration concessions from the government of Mozambique during the fifth round of bidding – Sasol got 5 concessions, Anadarko got 2 concessions and the rest got one each. Moreover, the government was able to approve and implement the first phase of its Coral floating liquefied natural gas development which has made it possible for the oil and gas sector to contribute to the national fiscus[25].


However, despite these successes, in 2016, the Mozambican economy only experienced an annual average growth rate of 6%[26]. This is, in part, because tensions between RENAMO and FRELIMO re-emerged in 2013[27]. RENAMO has been accusing FRELIMO of creating a regime of patronage, self-enrichment, and impunity while a large part of the population languishes in extreme poverty, indignity, and suffering[28]. These allegations have some merit. 90% of workers in Mozambique are forced to work in the informal sector, while the formal sector is dominated by a few powerful economic groups – most of whom benefit from their connections with the FRELIMO[29]. Moreover, in 2016 it was revealed that the government had taken secret loans through state owned companies (EMATUM, MAM and ProIndicus) and banks. As a result, the Mozambican government displays a huge public trust deficit with their overall foreign debt level peaking at 128.3% of GDP in 2016. These levels have dropped by 26% and were last recorded at 102.2% of GDP in January 2017[30], but the country is still in debt distress[31].


Because FRELIMO dominates Mozambique’s legislature and judiciary, RENAMO has turned to violence to try and enact political reform. In 2013 they started abducting expatriates working in the oil and gas industry. Since then gas mining companies have been forced to evacuate their expatriate workers for security reasons.[32]  Tensions continued to escalate in 2014, when RENAMO claimed they had won that year’s general election and insisted that they should govern the six northern and central provinces where they had won the majority of votes namely; Manica, Sofala, Tete, Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo Delgado[33]. In addition to election disputes, disagreements over the decentralisation of the government, the depoliticisation of the military and security forces, and the disarmament and re-integration into civil life of RENAMO troops have continued to fuel conflicts in the region[34]. These issues still need to be addressed if lasting peace, development and the growth of the oil industry and the economy in general are to be realised.


In 2018 the building conflict in Mozambique took a drastic turn. The conflict between the country’s two main political parties has created a climate of instability, which has encouraged the rise of two Islamic terrorist organisations in the north of the country. In May 2018, two new rebel factions, Al-Sunna wa Jama’a and Al-Shabab (although not publicly affiliated with the Somali group), killed at least 39 people and displaced more than 1000. In June 2018, the two groups burned more than 400 households in three districts in the Cabo Delgado province[35].


All these forms of instability have damaged investor confidence and it is generally believed that Mozambique cannot be a reliable supplier of oil and gas to other countries in the region[36]. However, this does not mean that oil and gas production have stopped. Politicians exploiting the conflict in the region and have begun to work in cahoots with multinational conglomerations to abuse resources for personal gain instead of using them to benefit the population[37]. Thus, political unpredictability, an unstable regulatory outlook, and widespread corruption make Mozambique a high-risk country to do business in despite its substantial oil and gas resource base.


The Mozambican government clearly recognises the threat that the continued conflict in the northern regions of the country has placed on the economy. Therefore, the government has supported the National Defense and Security Council (CNDS) and the National Defence Armed Forces in their stand against all insurgents in the Cabo Delgado province. The CNDS has focused on forming peaceful Working Groups to disarm RENAMO militants and integrate them into the society broadly[38]. While, the government should continue with its efforts to bring RENAMO into mainstream governance structures, it needs to do more if the country wants to avoid falling victim to the infamous resource curse by mustering the political will to prosecute members of the ruling FRELIMO party who have been implicated in acts of corruption and the illegal appropriation of state resources. They must do more to promote political stability, good governance, and social justice, as well as care for the disadvantaged in their county. This goal can only be achieved if there is peace, security, and the government implements their policies transparently and holds all parties who have broken the law accountable.


These goals cannot be realised by military force alone. As such a more integrated, community-based, grassroots approach involving all stakeholders (government, business, civil society groups, and community groups) must be implemented in tandem with President Nyusi’s efforts to strengthen the CNDS. Moreover, the oil and gas proceeds should be used to diversify of the economy, create jobs, and reduce poverty across the whole country. The Mozambican government also needs to work with other SADC countries and the international community at large to help cut down on corruption and ensure that the policies they implement benefit their people. These pragmatic economic programmes will help to create a lasting peace and stability in the northern regions of the country, contribute to the sustainable growth and expansion of the oil and gas industry, and consequently improve the quality of life and well-being of the people of Mozambique and beyond.


By Serge Hadisi and Fay Hodza

[1] le Pere, G. 2013. A Crude Awakening: Revisiting the Political Economy of Oil in Africa, on the Joburg Post Website, viewed on 30 November 2018, from https://www.joburgpost.co.za/.

[2] RMCC 2014. Natural Gas Master Plan, Republic of Mozambique Cabinet Council: Maputo. Available At: http://www.inp.gov.mz/ [Last Accessed: 2 November 2018].

[3] INP 2014. Wells, on the National Petroleum Institute Website, viewed on 2 November 2018, from http://www.inp.gov.mz/.

[4] Uetela, P. and Obeng-Odoom, F. 2016. ‘Natural Gas and Socio-Economic Transformation in Mozambique: Some Preliminary Evidence’, The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 41, No. 1-2, pp. 47-66. Available At: https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/ [Last Accessed: 27 September 2018].

[5] Uetela, P. and Obeng-Odoom, F. 2016. ‘Natural Gas and Socio-Economic Transformation in Mozambique: Some Preliminary Evidence’, ibid.

[6] Uetela, P. and Obeng-Odoom, F. 2016. ‘Natural Gas and Socio-Economic Transformation in Mozambique: Some Preliminary Evidence’, ibid.

[7] RMCC 2014. Natural Gas Master Plan, ibid.

[8] RMCC 2014. Natural Gas Master Plan, ibid.

[9] RMCC 2014. Natural Gas Master Plan, ibid.

[10] Bueno, N., Plagemann, J., and Strasheim, J. 2015. Provincial Autonomy: The Territorial Dimension of Peace in Mozambique, German Institute of Global and Area Studies: Hamburg. Available At: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/ [Last Accessed: 11 October 2018].

[11] Bueno, N. et al. 2015. Provincial Autonomy: The Territorial Dimension of Peace in Mozambique, ibid.

[12] Bueno, N. et al. 2015. Provincial Autonomy: The Territorial Dimension of Peace in Mozambique, ibid.

[13] Gqada, I. 2013. A Boom for Whom? Mozambique’s Natural Gas and the New Development Opportunity, South African Institute of International Affairs: Johannesburg. Available At: http://www.saiia.org.za/ [Last Accessed: 27 September 2018].

[14] AfDB 2018. Southern Africa Economic Outlook 2018, African Development Bank: Abidjan. Available At: https://www.afdb.org/ [Last Accessed: 11 October 2018].

[15] AfDB 2018. Southern Africa Economic Outlook 2018, ibid.

[16] AfDB 2018. Southern Africa Economic Outlook 2018, ibid.

[17] RMCC 2014. Natural Gas Master Plan, ibid.

[18] RMCC 2014. Natural Gas Master Plan, ibid.

[19] Lopes, T. P. and Ferreira, P. 2014. General Overview on the Oil and Gas Environment in Mozambique, on the IFLR 1000 Website, viewed on 10 November 2018, from https://www.iflr1000.com/.

[20] Rage, P. 2015. Understanding Mozambique’s New Oil and Gas Regime, Portfolio Media: New York. Available At: https://www.mayerbrown.com/ [Last Accessed: 10 November 2018].

[21] Rage, P. 2015. Understanding Mozambique’s New Oil and Gas Regime, ibid.

[22] GoM 2014. Petroleum Law No.21/2014, Government of Mozambique: Maputo. Available At: http://www.inp-mz.com/ [Last Accessed: 10 November 2018].

[23] Lopes, T. P. and Ferreira, P. 2014. General Overview on the Oil and Gas Environment in Mozambique, ibid.

[24] RMCC 2014. Natural Gas Master Plan, ibid.

[25] DTC 2016. Report on Oil and Gas for the Minister of Finance, Davis Tax Committee: Pretoria. Available At: http://www.taxcom.org.za/ [Last Accessed: 11 October 2018].

[26] IMF 2017. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa Restarting the Growth Engine, International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C. Available At: https://www.imf.org/ [Last Accessed: 9 November 2018].

[27] Chivangue, A. and Cortez, E. 2015. An Analysis of Mozambique’s Political and Economic Networks, Centre for the Study of Africa, Asia and Latin America: Lisbon. Available At: http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/ [Last Accessed: 25 November 2018].

[28] BS 2018. BTI 2018 Country Report: Mozambique, Bertelsmann Stiftung: Gütersloh. Available At: https://www.bti-project.org/ [Last Accessed: 27 September 2018].

[29] Chivangue, A. and Cortez, E. 2015. An Analysis of Mozambique’s Political and Economic Networks, ibid.

[30] CIA. 2018. The World Factbook: Mozambique, ibid.

[31] IMF  2018. Republic of Mozambique 2017 Article IV Consultation, International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C. Available At: http://www.imf.org/ [Last Accessed: 5 November 2018].

[32] ILPI 2013. Political Economy Analysis of the Petroleum Sector in Mozambique, International Law and Policy Institute: Oslo. Available At: https://norad.no/ [Last Accessed: 5 October 2018].

[33] BS 2018. BTI 2018 Country Report: Mozambique, ibid.

[34] BS 2018. BTI 2018 Country Report: Mozambique, ibid.

[35] HRW 2018. Mozambique: Armed Groups Burn Villages, on the Human Rights Watch Website, viewed on 19 August 2018, from https://www.hrw.org/.

[36] THF 2018. Mozambique, The Heritage Foundation: Washington, D.C. Available At: https://www.heritage.org/ [Last Accessed: 11 October 2018].

[37] Bueno, N. et al. 2015. Provincial Autonomy: The Territorial Dimension of Peace in Mozambique, ibid.

[38] PoM 2018. CNDS Welcomes the Efforts of the President of the Republic for Peace, on the Presidency of Mozambique Website, viewed on 19 August 2018, from http://www.presidencia.gov.mz/.

Policy Spotlight: Dealing with Conflict in SADC

Maintaining and preserving peace and security within the Southern African region was one of the primary motives for establishing the SADC. Regional organisations on the African continent such as the SADC, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and East African Community (EAC) strengthen regional integration and cooperation on issues of common interest such as security, economic growth and developmental issues.


The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) is assembled with the idea of warranting a consistent relationship between democracy, development and most importantly human security. As an instrument the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ it is not an end in itself, it does however enable the implementation of the OPDSC, according to the SADC development agenda[1]. Furthermore, the regions’ socio-economic development can only be achieved in a stable political and security environment. The implementation of the OPDSC should be adequate and warrants a relationship between democracy, development and security within the region.


The SADC has taken measures to ensure political stability and human security by adopting protocols and policies that aim to encourage democratic norms, political stability and security in the region. By establishing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in 2012, SADC has been relatively effective in maintaining and promoting peace and security compared to other regional organisations[2]. Other regional economic communities, such as ECOWAS and EAC, have moved beyond integration as a response to economic development towards maintaining regional peace and security. This was illustrated in SADC’s response by intervention in the DRC, which utilised the SADC OPDSC, SADC Troika to the post-election violence in the DRC from the 1998; 2006 and 2011 elections[3]. Similarly, during the election conflict in October 2014 in Mozambique, more than 20 000 refugees were displaced to South Africa, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Tanzania[4]. The response to these conflict situations shows the attempts that have been made to ensure conflict resolution by the organisation. The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation along with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections were effectively employed.


It is however, important to note that the SADC often falls short of adequately applying the protocol and it has resulted in an ineffective response to political instability and conflicts. SADC responses to politically driven conflicts particularly those surrounding elections lacks consistency. This was clearly illustrated by cases such as Lesotho, Mozambique and Madagascar. The SADC in partnership with the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC continues to intervene on issues of political instability and conflict in the DRC through the security sector reform. During the 2013 elections in Madagascar, SADC’s mediation process attempted to implement Article 11 of the 2012 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, for conflict prevention and management for the duration if the elections.


Nevertheless, cases like that of Lesotho and Mozambique present a different reality of how the SADC as an organisation has fallen short of adequately utilising key instruments to help curb possibilities of political instability and conflict in the region. As a means of assistance the SADCs’ efforts of intervention in Lesotho in 2014/15 were not successful. The organisation opted for the soft diplomacy route by means of mediation and facilitation, which resulted in a hurried election process (2015 instead of 2017) for the National Assembly under a legal and institutional framework that comprised of the 1993 amended Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho and the 2011 National Assembly Electoral Act[5]. Furthermore, rather than resolving the conflict through the intervention and mediation process, SADC only temporarily eased the political instability during both the 2015 and 2017 elections. It is therefore vital for the SADC to consistently keep its finger on the pulse and carefully monitor the build-up to political instability that often leads to unpredictable and swift elections.


Regional organisations such as the SADC and ECOWAS are often initiated with the motive of establishing a relationship between nation states within the region. This encourages economic growth and development through collaboration. Unlike SADC, ECOWAS soon realised that political instability and conflict challenges need to be equally addressed in order to create and maintain economic growth and development in the region. West African countries are at a critical stage of development and have great potential for both development and peace. However, persistent challenges such as political instability, violent conflicts and economic crises, may pose further challenges and vulnerability in the region in the near[6].


SADC has mostly failed to address challenges that have an impact on the defence sector i.e. hard issues (e.g. armed conflicts, maritime piracy, terrorism, arms trafficking etc.)[7]. ECOWAS is more prepared and equipped to confront and address hard issues compared to SADC. The SADC’s response to terrorism in both Mozambique and the DRC should raise concerns regarding the chosen approach by the organisation.


Even though terrorism in the North of Mozambique has abated since May 2018, the lack of intervention by the SADC is alarming. The reluctant response by SADC on matters of terrorism will in future amplify instability and conflict in the region. Although the SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation Intervention enables SADC to intervene on domestic terrorism, the SADC response of often inadequate.


In the DRC, in North and South Kivu, the Allied Democratic Forces and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda insurgence elicited no response from SADC. This is because of the limited peace keeping experience of the organ. In this regard, the leaders of the region launched the SADC Brigade in 2008 which supports regional peace operations and is made up of military, police and civilian members from SADC Member States[8]. In the same year, an SADC Extraordinary Summit decided that SADC would immediately deploy a team of military experts. Their objective was to assess the situation in DRC and dispatch the SADC Monitoring Commission to monitor the borders with Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda[9]. SADC did not however send peacekeeping troops in Eastern DRC despite the ongoing fighting due to lack of military capacity. SADC claimed that the short notice period made it impossible to convene troops[10]. The SADC Brigade is confronted by challenges including the availability of pledged forces, lack of logistics and low progress in the development of civilian capacities[11].


The Nigerian led ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was deployed to keep peace in Liberia in 1990. By 1993 the ECOMOG operation in Liberia was largely sustained by Nigeria’s willingness to bear the operational costs of the mission, which was by no means an easy one, particularly given the complexities associated with Liberia’s ethnic configuration. In Gambia, ECOWAS managed to instate the rightful leader by using the threat of violence against former President Yahya Jammeh who refused to vacate office after losing the December 2016 presidential elections[12]. However, in responding to Boko Haram, ECOMOG has been unable to contain its insurgence. Corruption has hindered ECOMOG’s success in containing Boko Haram’s insurgency as senior army officer’s transformed ECOMOG operations for personal enrichment[13].


Despite ECOMOG’s challenges, SADC can learn from the Liberia and Gambia cases. ECOWAS has taken charge of cooperation in bearing operational costs of attending to crises instead of waiting for the international community to come in and assist. They have also taken quick decisive actions to restore democracy in the region. There is need for robust policy implementation in the SADC region which can only be successful if member states are united as witnessed in the ECOWAS region.


By Pamelah Cheuka and Xolisile Ntuli

[1] SADC 2004. Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Southern African Development Community: Gaborone. Available At: https://www.sadc.int [Last Accessed: 3 December 2018].

[2] SADC 2012. Politics, Defence & Security Co-operation, on the Southern African Development Community Website, viewed on 3 December 2018, from https://www.sadc.int/.

[3] SADC 2017. SADC Organ Troika Ministerial Assessment Follow Up Mission 19th-22nd April 2017 Kinshasa, DRC, on the Southern African Development Community Website, viewed on 10 November 2018, from https://www.sadc.int /.

[4] HRW 2018. "The Next One to Die”: State Security Force and Renamo Abuses in Mozambique, on the Human Rights Watch Website, viewed on 9 November 2018, from https://www.hrw.org; UNHCR 2016. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016., on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Website, viewed on 3 December 2018, from https://www.unhcr.org/.

[5] AU 2015. African Union Election Observation Mission to the 3 June 2017 National Assembly Elections in the Kingdom of Lesotho, African Union: Maseru. Available At: https://au.int [Last accessed: 10 November 2018].

[6] Darkwa, L. 2011. The Challenge of Sub-Regional Security in West Africa: The Case of the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: Uppsala. Available At: http://nai.diva-portal.org/ [Last Accessed: 3 December 2018].

[7] van Nieuwkerk, A.and Hofmann, K. 2013. Southern African Security Review 2013, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Maputo.

[8] Hull, C. and Derblom, M. 2009. Abandoning Frontline Trenches?: Capabilities for Peace and Security in the SADC Region, Swedish Defence Research Agency: Stockholm. Available At: https://www.foi.se/ [Last Accessed: 3 December 2018].

[9] Kapinga, N. 2015. The Role of Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 1998-2003: ‘An Appraisal’, University of South Africa: Pretoria. Available At: http://uir.unisa.ac.za/.

[10] Boshoff, H. and Rupiya, M. 2003. ‘Delegates, Dialogue and Desperadoes’, African Security Review, Vol 12, Issue 3, pp. 29-37. Available At: https://www.tandfonline.com/ [Last Accessed: 3 December 2018].

[11] Amao, O. B. and Maiangwa, B. 2017. ‘Has the Giant Gone to Sleep? Re-assessing Nigeria’s Response to the Liberian Civil War (1990–1997) and the Boko Haram Insurgency (2009–2015)’, African Studies, Vol. 76, Issue 1, pp. 22-43. Available At: https://www.tandfonline.com/ [Last Accessed: 3 December 2018].

[12] ECOWAS 2016. ECOWAS Concludes 50th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government with A 67-Count Communiqué; Gambia, Peace, Security, Democracy, and Institutional Matters Top Decisions, on the Economic Community of West African States Website, viewed on 30 November 2018, from http://www.ecowas.int/.

[13] Amao, O. B. and Maiangwa, B. 2017. ‘Has the Giant Gone to Sleep? Re-assessing Nigeria’s Response to the Liberian Civil War (1990–1997) and the Boko Haram Insurgency (2009–2015)’, ibid.


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